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ory has failed is precisely because courts have been too pragmatic, too unprincipled, too ad hoc, and too majoritarian.
Professor Smith does not address many of the questions left
burning at the end of Foreordained Failure. He fails to say how
he would resolve the interpretive problems created by his historical argument, and he elects to give only a brief discussion of the
practical implications of his theoretical argument. Yet these are
not tragic flaws in his effort. Smith's historical argument is
powerfully presented, and he makes a valuable effort "to clarify
our situation by trying to explore the nature and sources of our
current confusion." (p. 121) Although Smith is wrong to suggest
that the elusive nature of "neutrality" renders the process of theorizing about religious liberty hopeless, he nicely ferrets out and
critiques the background assumptions that inform modem theories of religious freedom. His book is insightful, original, and
foreordained to succeed.

JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION. Edited by Warren F.
Schwartz.! New York: Cambridge University Press. 1995.
Pp. 246. Cloth, $49.95.
Hiroshi Motomuraz

Immigration law reduces to a few basic but difficult questions. Should we restrict entry by outsiders? If so, what principles guide those restrictions? And after a newcomer arrives,
when is she no longer a "newcomer," but one of "us"? These
three questions are deceptively simple when so phrased, but they
are the core issues of law and policy. We should keep them in
sharp focus, the mind-numbing complexity of the Immigration
and Nationality Act notwithstanding.
We can answer these questions from different perspectives.
One perspective involves policymaking through legislative and
administrative processes. This is, of course, the staple diet of the
Senate and House immigration subcommittees, as well as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Executive Office of
Immigration Review, and other administrative bodies. Our three
basic questions inform decisionmaking at this level, but inevita1. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
2. Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder. I would
like to thank Linda Bosniak and Carol Lehman for their thoughtful comments on earlier
drafts, and Hans-Joachirn Cremer for guidance on matters of German law.
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blythe process consists of reactions seriatim to immediate political pressures and concerns. A thousand architects and a
thousand carpenters have built the house of immigration law.
Where, then, do those who make immigration policy
through legislative and executive processes find the basic principles and norms that guide them and sometimes limit their
choices? The Constitution is the answer in many areas of American law. But in immigration law, the Constitution's ability to
play this role is limited by the plenary power doctrine, which severely restricts judicial challenges to immigration decisions by
the government.
One of the unfortunate consequences of the plenary power
doctrine is the absence of a dialogue between the judiciary and
the political branches based on a mature body of constitutional
doctrine that sets out the fundamental values and the outer
boundaries of immigration law and policy. True, the plenary
power doctrine has undergone significant erosion over the past
half-century. The Supreme Court has recognized a "limited judicial responsibility" to exercise constitutional judicial review in
immigration cases.J On another occasion, the Court suggested
that an immigration decision by the political branches must have
a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason," or else it cannot
withstand constitutional judicial review.4 Some courts have exercised this limited scrutiny to strike down immigration decisions
as unconstitutional.s Some courts have developed a procedural
due process exception to the plenary power doctrine.6 And other
courts, while not striking down statutes as unconstitutional, have
interpreted them to reach the same outcome.7 In spite of all of
this, the erosion of plenary power has not resulted in a coherent
body of constitutional principles.s Constitutional norms play a
role in advocacy, but it is very hard to predict when courts will be
persuaded.
3.
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See Fial/o v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977). Cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,

u.s. 580, 591 (1952).

4. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
5. See, e.g., Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 1994); Francis v.
INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976).
6. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1625 (1992).
7. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545 (1990).
8. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 Hast. Const. L.Q. 925 (1995); Peter H. Schuck, The
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
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We need a constitutional compass, not only for policymakers
in the legislative and executive branches, but also for judges
when they interpret and apply immigration statutes. And those
who would fashion that constitutional compass for these policymakers and judges need an even more basic sense of direction as
they consider the fundamental questions of immigration law.
This is the context for the significant contribution made by
Justice in Immigration, a collection of essays edited by Professor
Warren F. Schwartz. As the title suggests, the authors use the
language of justice and welfare to engage in a conversation about
immigration law and policy. Is it ever "just" for borders to keep
people out? If so, then when? Does immigration promote "welfare"? Whose welfare?
I

Joseph Carens opens the book with an essay that not only
introduces the other contributions but also deftly captures many
of the tough issues for today's immigration policymaker. He
groups issues under three separate but interconnected headings:
"special claims," culture, and economics. By "a special claim,"
Carens means "a distinctive and compelling moral claim to admission." (p. 4) His point that refugees and families both have
special claims makes sense, gently correcting the many policymakers who would not readily see the link. Moving to the second set of issues, Carens asks whether it is permissible to take
culture into account in the initial selection of immigrants. And if
so, how? And after initial admission, what degree of cultural adaptation may the receiving society legitimately expect of immigrants? As for the third issue-economics-to what extent
should the economic interests of the receiving society guide its
immigration policy? Even assuming that economic considerations should guide policy, how should we weigh the economic interests of different groups within the receiving society? And
what about the economic terms of admission? What social entitlements should we provide newcomers? Carens conveys the
treacherous complexity of these questions while providing a clear
roadmap for the other authors' answers to these questions, including a brief but accurate summary of the other ten essays.
A collection of essays by eleven different authors hardly
lends itself to detailed review in a few pages, and specific criticism of the views in the book is available in the book itself, as
many of the essays respond to others. Rather, the focus here is
not on their specific theses, but on their common ground in ori-
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entation and method. For many readers of a journal called Constitutional Commentary, the most intriguing aspect of this book
will be its relationship with the constitutional aspects of immigration law. Precisely because the application of constitutional principles to immigration cases is so unclear, a parallel (or anterior)
inquiry in the language of justice and welfare has great promise.
Much of the book asks whether and how fundamental principles of liberal democracy place outer limits on the content of
immigration law and policy. As Michael Trebilcock puts it in his
essay: "How does one define and justify the conditions of membership in the community?" (p. 219) In his words, immigration
policy debates in "all Western democracies" center around "two
core values that stand to some irreducible degree in opposition to
each other: liberty and community." (p. 220)
Individual autonomy is a core value in a liberal democracy,
but immigration laws restrict the free movement of individuals if
they are outsiders or nonmembers. Yet, are limits on immigration necessary to maintain other essential aspects of a liberal democracy? What, for example, is the role of immigration in the
construction of community? And to what degree is the construction of community essential to the individual autonomy of those
who, as members, engage in that enterprise?
Individual autonomy in one form-through freedom of
movement-thus stands in tension with individual autonomy in
another form-through restrictions on the movement of others,
which may be necessary to construct communities within which
to pursue liberal democratic goals. This tension prompts many of
the authors in this collection to search for principles of justice to
help resolve this tension, and even more fundamentally, to ask
whether there can be a resolution at all. As Jules Coleman and
Sarah Harding put the question in their contribution: "Are immigration policies the sorts of things that fall within the ambit of
distributive justice?" (p. 39)
Or instead, must we think of distributive justice as applying
to communities, and not across the borders of communities? In
other words, is "membership" in a community anterior to
"rights" recognized by a community? Or does every human being have some justice-based claim to become a member? Most of
these authors seem to believe that we owe more membershipbased obligations to those who are somehow "closer" to us. But
these authors vary on exactly how we should meet those obligations, and in turn on what immigration restrictions are morally
permissible under principles of justice.
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These authors include some of the nation's most distinguished and prolific scholars in law, philosophy, and economics.
Interestingly, many of them have little background in immigration law and policy. (Joseph Carens is a notable exception.) This
combination of erudition and innocence is the source of many of
the book's virtues-and a few vices.
First, a brief but necessary word about the vices. Several
essays get the law wrong in places. A sampling would include:
that family-based immigration is not numerically limited (p. 47)
(true for parents, spouses, and minor children of citizens, but
false for other relatives of citizens and for all relatives of permanent residents )9; that alienage is a suspect classification (p. 179)
(since the Supreme Court announced that principle in Graham v.
Richardson,w it has declined to apply it in a number of cases,
notably Mathews v. Diaz);u that ethnic Germans around the
world have "a right to claim citizenship" (pp. 21, 31) (German
citizenship requires more than mere German ethnicity);tz and
that Germany permits asylum applicants to work pending a decision (p. 24) (as a rule, they may not).l3
There are a few other curious passages. The use of the term
"legalized aliens" to refer to permanent residents (p. 22) is confusing, since "legalized aliens" are previously undocumented
aliens who acquired lawful status under the amnesty provisions
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.14 It is not
quite right to say that citizenship is "essential to vote in any election in the United States and Canada." (p. 27) A few American
localities permit noncitizen voting. While these are isolated exceptions, they have figured prominently in discussions of alien
suffrage.ts Statements about the rarity of naturalization in Germany (p. 32) overlook recent government initiatives to ease the
legal requirements. And one account of the history of American
9. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 201-203 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 11511153).
10. 403 u.s. 365, 371-72 (1971).
11. 426 u.s. 67, 78-80 (1971).
12. See Bundesvertriebenengesetz § 6(1); Hans Alexy, Rechtsfragen des Aussiedlerzuzugs, 1989 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2850.
13. Arbeitserlaubnisverordnung § 5; Arbeitsfi:irderungsgesetz § 19(4).
14. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359,
3394 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a).
15. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Borders,
and Fundamental Law 10 (Princeton U. Press, 1996); Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the
People": Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 Mich. J. Int'l L. 259, 292300 (1992); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional
and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1391, 1460-61 (1993).
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immigration law (p. 152) disregards important research on the
extensive body of state immigration regulation before 1875.1 6
These are more than mere quibbles. They undermine the
confidence of the informed and experienced reader. However,
from a purely analytical standpoint, these passages never undermine the author's basic point. At a more fundamental level,
these essays are full of the illuminating, the perceptive, and the
provocative. What is interesting-and this is the reason to raise
these concerns-is that the book is often illuminating, perceptive, and provocative precisely because the authors seem unencumbered by conventional wisdom, or by the details of doctrine,
for that matter.
II

A.

DEFINING IMMIGRATION LAW

This collection makes significant contributions on several
questions that have important parallels in constitutional immigration law. One question is quite basic: what is "immigration
law"? The traditional definition includes admitting noncitizens
into the United States and allowing them to remain. Until the
recent changes in the 1996 immigration reform legislation, this
meant "admission," "exclusion," and "deportation." Now the
terminology is "admission," "inadmissibility," and "removal."I7
Thus, "immigration law" proper does not include aliens' rights
and responsibilities once they are in the United States; such
"nonimmigration" questions belong to a distinct body of "alienage" law. The line between immigration law and alienage law is
important-above all because courts typically apply the plenary
power doctrine to limit judicial review of "immigration" but not
"alienage" matters. One of the fundamental conceptual
problems for immigration law scholarship is this elusive but pivotal line between immigration law and alienage law.ts
Mark Tushnet defines immigration policy to include not only
immigration proper, but also the integration of migrants into the
receiving society, i.e., questions on the alienage side. (p. 147)
Treating immigration and alienage together is key to Tushnet's
16. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
Colum. L. Rev. 1833 (1993).
17. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
§ 304, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
18. See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1047 (1994); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and
Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 201, 203 (1994).
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ultimate conclusion: that immigration restrictions are generally
inconsistent with principles of liberal democracy. Jean Hampton
and Alan Sykes work with similar definitions. (pp. 89, 183-84)
James Buchanan likewise focuses on problems of integration,
particularly the problem that immigrants, even if they have no
net economic impact, may undermine the social and political order if they are allowed immediate and direct political participation. (p. 65) Louis Michael Seidman takes an equally broad view
of "immigration" when he contrasts Plyler v. Doei9 with the absence of judicial review for deportation decisions. Seidman asks:
"How can it be that it is constitutional to deport them, thereby
depriving them of both a U.S. education and physical presence,
but that it violates their constitutional rights to deprive them of a
U.S. education without depriving them of physical presence?"
(p. 142)
These authors may be right to look beyond the separation
between immigration law and alienage law, and to adopt this
broader definition of immigration law and policy without express
defense or elaboration. Indeed, I share the view that we need to
integrate immigration and alienage law into a larger body of constitutional principles governing membership. Yet, the informed
reader may wonder why these authors do not pause to mention
the considerable debate about this definition. Prominently,
Michael Walzer has provided a seminal, highly textured account
of the relationship between immigration and alienage issues.
Much of his treatment suggests that any efforts to integrate immigration and alienage law must consider some key differences between them.zo
B.

PERMISSIBLE LIMITS ON IMMIGRATION

The book also contributes by addressing a second basic
question with important parallels in constitutional immigration
law: what, if any, limits on immigration are permissible in a liberal democracy? Jules Coleman and Sarah Harding explore the
tension between liberal democracy and immigration restrictions
by surveying the laws of several Western liberal democracies.
They evaluate these laws by asking what conception of justice
would justify them, and that analysis leads them to question the
legitimacy of states and borders. Jean Hampton discusses nonconsensual, ethnicity-based or race-based conceptions of mem19. 457 u.s. 202 (1982).
20. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 52-61
(Basic Books, 1983). See also Bosniak, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1068-87 (cited in note 18).
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bership-such as in Germany and Japan-to illustrate the sort of
immigration restrictions that are incompatible with liberal democracy. After examining the contrast with a "consensual"
model, her evaluation of the nonconsensual model leads her to
question the "legitimacy of the nation-state." (p. 78) Hampton
"reject[s] most citizenship policies driven by a strong sense of nationalist identity." (p. 68)
Stephen Perry discusses how a liberal democracy can strike a
coherent balance between universal and localized obligations.
He concludes that the obligations of liberal states toward outsiders (especially refugees) are more extensive than usually recognized in practice, but that these universal obligations do not
negate additional and greater localized obligations. (p. 105) Receiving societies should have some discretion as to the numbers
of immigrants admitted, and immigration restrictions are not
"fundamentally illiberal" per se. But Perry argues that some restrictions are impermissible. (p. 105) A liberal democracy may
not exclude on cultural grounds; by way of exception, however,
culturally based admission criteria may be used for refugees only.
(pp. 110-24) In contrast, Seidman doubts that the fundamental
tension between universal and local obligations can ever be reconciled. He argues that Coleman and Harding's defense of the
right to membership "fails to capture our ambivalence about the
duties we may owe to persons outside our own political community." (p. 136)
By addressing the question of what limits on immigration
are permissible in a liberal democracy, these essays shed light on
parallel topics in constitutional immigration law. One parallel
concerns the plenary power doctrine itself. The idea that we owe
duties to those outside our political community is highly relevant
to one criticism of the plenary power doctrine. Without such duties, there is one less reason for constitutional judicial review and
one more reason for plenary power. After all, the plenary power
doctrine derives much of its justification from the view that rights
are only for members, and hence that the Constitution has no
application to immigration decisions. The relevance of these essays to plenary power goes one important step further. Skepticism about the nation-state itself and about national borders
forces us to think beyond the "national imagination" in which
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much legal and political discourse about immigration takes
place.21
Here is another parallel: the discussions of ethnicity-based,
or race-based conceptions of membership are helpful in understanding the role of race and national origin in United States immigration law.n The parallel in constitutional immigration law
lies in the nondiscrimination norm in our constitutional culture
generally, and its statutory expression in immigration law in the
1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act.23
Pertinent here is Hampton's caution that her "argument against
nation-states is not an argument against the importance of a cultural community, but it is an argument against the idea that cultural and political communities should always-or even
usually-overlap." (p. 87-88) Perry makes a related point: it is
the character of culture that counts, not its substance. A liberal
democracy may restrict membership to maintain some culture,
but not to maintain a particular culture, for example with a certain racial or ethnic composition. Thus Perry writes: "a liberal
state always contains the seeds of a pluralist society." (p. 120)
And Tushnet writes: "Membership in some community is morally
valuable. Membership in a community constituted in a particular
way is not." (p. 155)
C.

WHOSE JUSTICE, WHOSE WELFARE?

The book asks a third key question with a important parallel
in constitutional immigration law: whose "justice" or "welfare"
matters? To the extent that this question poses a choice between
members and outsiders, a number of the essays address it as part
of their analysis of permissible limits on immigration. But to the
extent that the choice is between members competing for influence over immigration policy, the book devotes relatively little
analysis.
The one exception is Gillian Hadfield, who writes: "At first
the normative question raised with respect to immigration law
appears to be, Who should we let in? But if we press on this
characterization of the issue, I think we will see that it begs a
21. See Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the
National Imagination, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 555, 570-71, 585-90, 598-600 (1996). See also
sources cited id. at 604 n.119.
22. See Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional Immigration Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1927, 1938-52 (1996) ("Two Models"); Stephen H.
Legornsky, Immigration, Equality, and Diversity, 31 Colum. J. Transnat'l. L. 319 (1993).
23. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911. See generally Two Models at 1932-38 (cited in note 22).
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deeper question: Who are 'we'?" (p. 204) She elaborates:
"[i]mmigration policy, the existence of borders that mark some
as insiders and others as outsiders, is logically prior to the normative defense of conventional welfare analysis." (p. 204) Thus, "a
social welfare function that reflects the well-being of men alone
or current workers alone is to assume away the ethical issues
raised." (p. 205) From this Hadfield concludes: "a social welfare
function that focuses exclusively on the impact of immigration on
current residents cannot be the basis for the economist's participation in a normative debate on immigration." (p. 205) Her solution is a "global social welfare" perspective. Whether or not
this is persuasive, Hadfield's essay helpfully raises the problem of
the perspective from which the "we" is defined.
Here the constitutional parallel is this question: with whose
rights should lawmakers be concerned? Constitutional immigration law needs to pay more attention to this issue. The traditional view in constitutional immigration law is that the plenary
power doctrine stands opposed to the recognition of immigrants'
rights. Another view, which deserves further development by
judges, advocates, and scholars, is that the rights of members to
confer membership on outsiders is not necessarily a power exercised by the state, and that the process of conferring membership
is more pluralistic than in commonly recognized. The complexities of this process should be taken much more seriously than
they have been historically.z4
III

Beyond contributing with regard to these three questions
with parallels in constitutional immigration law, the book highlights some aspects of immigration law and policy that are easy to
forget. A doctrinal approach to immigration law and policy
tends to overlook the fact that immigration is just one way to
transfer resources across borders, and that redrawing of borders,
trade, and foreign aid are alternatives. We might also consider
forms of direct action besides foreign aid, for example military
intervention. Perry makes these links explicit. (p. 103) Sykes
points out that some of the costs associated with immigration are
not costs of immigration at all, but rather costs of entitlement
programs and other public benefits open to immigrants. (p. 176)
Susan Vroman is right that Sykes' argument in favor of immigra24. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens,
and the Constitution, 97 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1997); Two Models at 1942-45 (cited
in note 22); Motomura, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. at 201-16 (cited in note 18).
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tion is "quite similar to the argument used in favor of free international trade." (p. 212) And as previously mentioned, several
authors raise basic questions about viewing immigration from a
perspective that assumes the legitimacy of the nation-state or of
states and borders generally.
The questions raised in this volume are sometimes more interesting and helpful than the answers that the authors propose.
For example, several essays discuss the obligations owed to "refugees." Coleman and Harding conclude that "all refugees have a
right to immigrate." (p. 52) But who is a "refugee"? The
problems of refugee and asylum policy would be less intractable
if we could always ascertain who they are. Often lacking is an
awareness of the problems of procedure, as matters of both administration and due process. Similarly, the book devotes considerable analysis to whether immigrants contribute to the
American economy. To be sure, the answer affects virtually all
immigration choices. But economic analysis is only the beginning of inquiry. Typical legislative choices do not concern immigration per se but rather narrower choices about specific
categories. Even Tushnet hedges his conclusion: "As a matter of
principle, liberals ought to be committed to relatively unrestricted immigration policies." (p. 155, emphasis added) In the
end, what does "relatively" mean? Isn't defining "relatively" the
whole game?
The idea that there are fundamental norms-whether they
are styled "liberal democratic principles" or "constitutional immigration law"-that guide and limit immigration law is key to
its sound and coherent future development. The book's claim in
the front matter to be the "first interdisciplinary study" of the
subject is overstated.2s But we do need more of them.

25. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 89-95 (Yale U.
Press, 1980); Yasemin Nuholu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational
Membership in Europe (U. of Chicago Press, 1994); Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense
of Pluralism and Equality at 31-62 (cited in note 20); Mark Gibney, ed., Open Borders?
Closed Societies?: The Ethical and Political Issues (Greenwood Press, 1988); William Rodgers Brubaker, ed., Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North
America (U. Press of America, 1989); Symposium: Law and Community, 84 Mich. L. Rev.
1373 (1986); Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 Va. J. Int'l L.
237 (1994); Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship, 35 Va. J. lnt'l L. 279 (1994); David A.
Martin, The Civic Republican Ideal for Citizenship and for Our Common Life, 35 Va. J.
Int'l L. 301 (1994); and Peter H. Schuck, Whose Membership Is It, Anyway? Comments on
Gerald Neuman, 35 Va. J. lnt'l L. 321 (1994).

